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Kenya’s Coast: Religion, Race, 
Ethnicity and the Elusive Nature of 
Political Community
Justin Willis & Hassan Mwakimako
In January 2019, Kenya’s already crowded political landscape was joined 
by another new party. The Umoja Summit Political Party was, avowedly, a 
party for the coast “formed on the basis of bringing back the elusive unity 
of the region,” as its founder declared.1 Observers might have been forgiven 
for regarding this initiative with scepticism. Following the general elections 
of 2013 there had been a series of meetings amongst a slightly shifting cast 
of politicians from the six counties which had—until the implementation of 
the 2010 constitution—made up Kenya’s Coast Province. Those meetings 
too had announced the formation of a new party to embody coastal unity.2 
Even then, the idea was one with a long and inglorious history. There had 
been several avowedly “coast” parties in the brief initial phase of party 
politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s—the Coast People’s Party, the 
Coast African People’s Union, the Kenya Protectorate National Party 
(Salim 1973). The idea that the coast should have its own party had been 
revived in the 1990s, with a succession of parties laying claim to this role: 
Shirikisho and the Kenya African Democratic Union–Asili are the most 
obvious examples (Gona 2008). Again and again, it has been argued that a 
distinct political constituency of wapwani (“coast people”) or (as some put 
it) “coastarians” requires united political representation.3
The idea of such a party reflects Kenya’s wider politics which, while 
they have been described as ethnic or “ethno-nationalist,” may more 
usefully be called “ethno-regional”—since the grievances that lie behind 
ethnic mobilisation are a long-term product of regional inequalities (Muigai 
2004; Branch & Cheeseman 2009, 3). Regional big men seek to mobilise 
1. Baya, Samuel. 2019. “New Coast Party Out to Woo Hassan Joho, Amason 
Kingi.” Daily Nation, 27 January. https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/USPP-
the-new-party-in-the-Coast/1064-4953386-8hvi3kz/index.html [archive].
2. “Coast Region to Form One Political Party.” 2014. The Star, 6 January. 
3. “Coast MPs to Quit ODM for New Party.” 2014. The Star, 1 April; “Coast Leaders 
to Discuss Political Future.” 2014, The Star, 13 November; “MPs Form Group for 
Unity, Economic Clout.” 2015. The Star, 17 November.
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and maintain political constituencies which are defined both by ethnicity 
and locality, amid a popular sense that government is unpredictable and 
responsive only to claims made through the affective ties of kinship, 
ethnicity and locality. The core term of this politics is marginalisation. It is 
a term that expresses a salient historical truth—that the centralised nature 
of the post-independence constitution allowed incumbent presidents to 
channel the spoils of power to their own home regions. It is also a term 
that has become something of a cliché; now every act of political claims-
making tends to be prefaced by the assertion that a particular community 
and region has been marginalised. Yet those who claim to speak for the 
coast will readily agree that the region has been especially subject to 
marginalisation under British rule and subsequently; grievances over land, 
education and employment are keenly felt.
Despite their unanimity on that core issue, however, those who claim 
to represent the coast have never actually created a distinctive coast party 
with general support, nor is there likely to be one in the near future. Though 
a succession of politicians from the coast have risen to brief prominence, 
all have struggled to mobilise widespread support at the coast itself. The 
idea of a coast party has been encouraged by the sense that since 2007 there 
has been a strong vote at the coast for Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic 
Movement. But as this chapter will suggest, the coast has not been, and still 
is not, a single political community. There are multiple divisions among the 
people who live in the six counties of the former Coast Province; like other 
ethno-regional identities, the coast is in practice deeply contested. Raila 
Odinga’s apparent popularity in a succession of elections and referenda 
rested on a shared sense that the coast has been disadvantaged by central 
government—but was possible partly because he is not from the coast, and 
so cannot be readily identified with any particular one of the groups who vie 
to embody the coast. While “the coast” can be imagined as a singularity—
the antithesis of “up-country” Kenya—there are in truth are many coasts, 
and they exist in tension with one another.
1. Where is the Coast?
A campaign for secession flourished briefly on the coast just before Kenya’s 
independence in the early 1960s, and has been revived in the early twenty-
first century in the context of debates over Kenya’s constitution (Willis 
& Gona 2013). The campaign has always been driven by fears of political 
and economic domination by people from other parts of Kenya, but it was 
partly predicated on a historical distinction. The initial establishment of 
British authority at the coast, in the 1880s, had rested on the legal basis 
of the 1886 Anglo-German treaty, which had declared a ten-mile strip, 
running south along the coast from the mouth of the Tana River, to be the 
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territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The Sultan leased this to the British 
East Africa Company in 1887. In 1895 the British government took direct 
control of the strip as part of the larger British East Africa Protectorate. 
When, in 1920, the rest of that Protectorate became Kenya Colony, the strip 
remained, formally, the territory of the Sultan—hence the title “Colony 
and Protectorate of Kenya.” So it was that as independence neared in the 
early 1960s, some argued that “Mwambao,” as they called it, should either 
be returned to Zanzibari rule or become independent by itself (Brennan 
2008; Prestholdt 2014). Those arguments were echoed some fifty years later 
by the supporters of the nebulous Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), 
which again called for independence for the coast. The MRC insisted—
quite without evidence—that the 1963 agreement by which the Sultan had 
renounced all claims to sovereignty in the coast was subject to a time limit, 
and expired in 2013. Those campaigners for secession, in the early 1960s 
and in the early twenty-first century, were deliberately vague in their use of 
the term “coast.” Sometimes this focussed on the shoreline, but sometimes it 
effectively embraced the whole of Coast Province, which stretched far inland 
to the Taita hills, and included a long finger of land along the Tana River, 
roughly following the area inhabited by Pokomo people. The claim that 
this larger coast could—or should—form a political community was driven 
by the idea that the “original” inhabitants of the province were threatened 
by an “up-country” monopoly on wealth and power; here, as elsewhere in 
Kenya, the claims of autochthony have been strengthened since the 1990s 
by the international efflorescence of a language of indigeneity (Hughes 
2005; Geschiere 2009; Lynch 2011). This “coast” was very much larger—
and more clearly defined on the map—than the “ten-mile strip,” which had 
never been marked out by administrative boundaries (Willis & Gona 2013).
Both “ten-mile strip” and “Coast Province” were, of course, in some 
measure arbitrary: the first a useful legal device in the partition of Africa; 
the second a colonial and post-colonial administrative convenience. Yet 
the difference between these two definitions of the coast expresses two 
quite different imaginaries of the coast as a physical territory, as well as 
a human society—on the one hand, as a thin fringe of shoreline, looking 
out to the Indian Ocean for its commerce and cultural inspiration; on the 
other hand, as a wider landscape, across which people move and trade 
continually, combining shoreline with a hinterland which embraces both 
the relatively well-watered agricultural land of the coastal ridge and the 
Taita hills, and a swathe of semi-arid land long used by pastoralists. These 
contending imaginaries are both shaped by—and shape—everyday life in 
the very varied territory embraced by what are now the six “coast” counties; 
and these differing territorial visions are overlaid on religious, ethnic and 
racial divides, sometimes cross-cutting and sometimes coinciding. All of 
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these categories are, of course, social constructs: yet they are powerful 
forces in shaping people’s experience and their ideas of personal and 
collective interests.
2. The Muslim Coast?
For many Kenyans—including many at the coast—the coast and Islam 
are somehow synonymous. Islam has a long history at the coast; both 
archaeological remains and the current architecture and public culture of 
most shoreline towns reveal the powerful presence of Islam as a daily part 
of many people’s lives over more than a thousand years. But in terms of 
population, the six counties of the coast are by no means overwhelmingly 
Muslim. According to the 2019 census, there are significantly more 
Christians (2.4 million) than Muslims (1.6 million) in the six counties of 
the coast. Muslims are in a majority only in Kwale, Lamu and Tana River 
(Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2019, 422). While the population of 
the towns and smaller settlements of the shoreline have historically been 
Muslim, the people of the hinterland have not. South of Mombasa, and 
along the Tana River, there was a relatively swift process of Islamisation in 
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries; but in the quite densely settled 
hinterland immediately north of Mombasa, Islam spread more slowly 
(Holway 1970). While Christianity too was slow to win converts at the coast 
in the colonial period, it spread more swiftly from the 1960s (Deacon et al. 
2017). Even more significant, however, has been the movement to the coast 
of people from elsewhere in Kenya—“up-country” people, or wabara, as 
coast people call them—a large proportion of whom are Christians (Sperling 
2000). This migration to the coast was already apparent in colonial Kenya, 
as Mombasa in particular drew in workers from many miles away. Since 
independence, this in-migration has continued, and over time it has come 
to affect many areas of the coast. It has been particularly apparent in the 
main towns and centres of the tourist industry along the shoreline, but is 
also a feature of some settlement schemes (Kanyinga 2000).
Relations between Christians and Muslims have often been tense. As 
David Sperling (2000) has argued, there has been a history of religious 
plurality at the coast. Both in the rural hinterland and in some urban 
settlements, a family may have members who are Christian, Muslim, or 
who follow neither faith, living close together and routinely involved 
in each other’s daily lives; everywhere, Muslims and Christians live as 
neighbours, and there is no religious “zoning,” though some areas may 
have particular concentrations of one faith or another. But this plurality 
has come under strain (Mwakimako 2007). Over the last three decades, a 
narrative of collective Muslim marginalisation has become increasingly 
powerful. This identifies individuals’ quotidian experiences of inequality 
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and discrimination as aspects of a global marginalisation of Muslims as 
a community. While this narrative of marginalisation is by no means the 
only way in which Muslims at the coast talk about their political interests 
or identity, it is nevertheless powerful, and it has inspired a whole range of 
political involvements, from a peaceful activism focussing on constitutional 
change and human rights, to a violent radicalism which entirely rejects the 
state (Chome 2019; Thordsen 2009). At the same time, the identification of 
Christianity with political and economic power in Kenya has become ever 
more apparent (Wandera 2008–9). This is, moreover, a Christianity which 
is increasingly Pentecostal and often overtly hostile to Islam (Gifford 1994). 
The sense that Christianity and Islam are in conflict is readily aroused 
(Chome 2019, 17–18). Suspicion that Christians receive favoured treatment 
from the state merges with resentment against people who have moved to 
the coast from other parts of Kenya, many of whom are Christian.
This sense of exclusion in Kenya has become entwined with debates 
on the position of Muslims internationally, which have become ever more 
intense in recent years, enabled by new technologies and driven by events 
in Palestine and elsewhere in the Middle East, and by the complex conflict 
in Somalia. One consequence of this has been the emergence of a violent 
radicalism in Kenya, particularly amongst Muslim youth (Shinn 2007). 
The terrorist bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 
1998 were largely externally planned, but between 2001 and 2014 there 
was a steady increase in the frequency of attacks, and considerable local 
recruitment of men who committed themselves to a violent jihad, largely 
at the coast, but also elsewhere in Kenya. Such recruitment built on the 
argument that local experiences—of poverty, poor education, landlessness, 
and misgovernment—are simply manifestations of a wider pattern of 
discrimination against Muslims globally, and that the only effective way 
to counter them is the violent overthrow of the state, and of the wider 
international system. The Kenya military intervention in Somalia in 2011 
lent strength to this argument, and led to increased violence. Alongside 
occasional major terrorist attacks—one of which, at Mkepetoni, targeted 
a major centre of up-country settlement at the coast in a clear attempt to 
appeal to Muslim grievances—there was from 2012 to 2015 a bitter little war 
of assassination and counter-assassination, mostly in and around Mombasa, 
between the security forces, suspected radicals and suspected informers 
(Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). The often-brutal and extra-legal campaign 
of “counter-terrorism” at the coast increased tensions (Prestholdt 2011; 
Open Society Justice Initiative/MUHURI 2013). In 2012 and 2013, when 
radical preachers died in targeted assassinations which were widely blamed 
on the security forces, there were riots in Mombasa in which churches 
became the target of angry Muslim protesters; Christian pastors were also 
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attacked in several incidents. The ambiguous position of Christianity at 
the coast was evident in the debates around the nature of the MRC. Those 
who claimed to be the leaders of the MRC were Muslims; and MRC slogans 
appeared spray-painted on urban walls alongside the slogans of radical 
Islam, apparently by the same hands. Yet some MRC supporters insisted 
that this was a movement for all “coast” people, not just for Muslims (Willis 
& Gona 2013; Deacon et al. 2017).
A similar uncertainty characterises the debate over a “Coast party”; 
must the coast be represented by a Muslim leader? The most prominent 
politicians from the coast in the 1960s were Christians: Ronald Ngala was 
a Christian; so too was well-known politician of the early 2000s, Karisa 
Maitha (despite his earlier association with the United Muslims of Africa, 
an organisation founded with government backing in the 1990s to confront 
anti-government Muslim activists on the streets of Mombasa). But Maitha, 
who died in 2005, was not ostentatious about his Christianity; nor was 
Ngala. In the current national political climate, in which church services 
and fund-raisings are routinely used as political platforms, and political 
events blur uncertainly into prayer meetings, it would be difficult for a 
Christian national politician to avoid very public displays of faith; which, 
in turn, would make problematic any claims to leadership of “the coast.” 
In recent years, those who sought national status as leaders of the coast—
Najib Balala, Chirau Mwakwere, and most recently Hassan Joho—have 
been Muslims; though, as will be explained below, ideas of ethnicity and 
race have undermined their ambitions.
If the divide between Muslims and Christians on the coast has become 
more evident in recent years, so too have divisions among Muslims. The 
perceived contest between “African Islam” and “Islam in Africa” has 
become a near-dominant analytical paradigm for understanding tensions 
amongst Muslims in Africa (Cruise O’Brien 1981; Rosander 1997). The 
neatness of that paradigm may misrepresent a reality in which individuals 
live across the two categories (Otayek and Soares 2007); but clearly Islam 
on Kenya’s coast has long been shaped by debates over what it means to 
live properly as a Muslim (Chome 2019). Generations of Muslim reformers 
have sought to change established local practices and beliefs. Though the 
process is often dated to the 1970s, in Kenya it was first apparent in the 
1930s, in the work of Shaykh Al-Amin Mazrui, and gained energy from 
the 1960s, notably through the work of scholars on the northern island of 
Faza, who were inspired by Egyptian teachers (Pouwels 1981; Swaleh 2012). 
External finance, and the intellectual influence of Islamic institutions of 
higher education outside Kenya, have played a part in these debates. From 
the 1960s, a growing range of governments and international bodies offered 
scholarships for religious studies, and provided funds for the building of 
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mosques and madrassa, and for the salaries of imams. Young men from the 
coast went to study in Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Sudan, and latterly also in 
Uganda; they returned with belief both that Islam should be spread to non-
believers, and that “innovations”—the Arabic word bid’a is routinely used 
in Swahili to describe these—which had crept into orthodox Islam should 
be removed, as part of a process of religious and social reform and renewal 
(the Arabic words, islah and tajdid, are routinely used in Swahili and English 
text and speech for “reform” and “renewal”). South Asian movements such 
as the Tabligh Jamaat also became active participants in a rural campaign of 
proselytisation. Empowered by their education—which gave them the all-
important ability to pursue theological debates in Arabic—and by the funds 
which supported them and allowed them to run minor local education and 
welfare projects, these men steadily shifted the terms of debate, and the 
bounds of permissible practice (Kresse 2007). The result has been tension 
over the propriety of some long-established practices: some funeral prayers; 
the offering of prayers at the tombs of renowned holy men; the playing of 
music in mosques as part of the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday (the 
mawlid). Physical confrontations over these issues, became less common by 
around 2010, but debates remained lively, and occasionally divisive. After 
2010, some practices—such as the celebration of mawlid—which had vanished 
for a time under the influence of the reformers have begun to reappear.
The debate over “innovation,” on the Kenya coast as elsewhere in Africa, 
is often cast as a contest between a moderate form of established practice—
usually described as Sufi—socially tolerant, and politically uninvolved as 
well as syncretic in ritual, and an intrusive reformism which is strict in its 
view of religious practice, intolerant of diversity and is inherently political. 
The reformist work of Salafists—as most now prefer to be called, shunning 
the Wahhabist label which some still apply to them—has come to be seen 
as linked with radical projects of political Islam and with violence and acts 
of terrorism (Haynes 2005; Rosenau 2005; Loimeier 2011). The narrative of 
Salafists using Saudi money or training to displace a tolerant local Islam 
is not wholly misleading (Ndzovu 2018). Yet it requires some nuancing. 
“Sufism” takes a particular form at the Kenya coast: practices associated 
with Sufism have been common in Islam at the coast. But, while mosques 
in which these practices are common may consider themselves as “tariqa 
mosques,” Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa) actually have little significance. 
The widespread networks of spiritual patronage—and therefore of social 
power—which characterise Sufism in, for example, Senegal, are much less 
significant on the Kenyan coast. More importantly, the simple association 
of Salafism with “Islamism”—that is, with the quest for a political system 
run along Islamic principles—may underestimate the growing political 
engagement of all Muslims, which is both a wider Kenyan and international 
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phenomenon (Thordsen 2009). In Kenya, and on the coast in particular, 
the politics of multi-partyism and the constitutional debates which have 
dominated public life for the last two decades have involved Muslims from 
the outset (Bakari 1995; Haynes 2006). In the early 1990s the Islamic Party 
of Kenya (IPK) was for a time one of the most prominent organisations 
calling for political change (Cruise O’Brien 2003; Oded 1996). While it came 
to be dominated by a radical preacher who had studied in the Middle East, 
IPK’s agenda was to challenge despotism, and mainly focussed on opening 
up political space for Muslim youth through multi-partyism and electoral 
participation. Since then, multiple Muslim organisations have been closely 
involved in constitutional debates, both because of the perceived threat 
to the position of “Kadhi courts” (which provided justice to Muslims in 
matters of personal law) and because constitutional reform was seen as a 
way to overcome the political and economic marginalisation of Muslims. 
In both 2005 and 2010, Muslim organisations took very clear stands in 
constitutional referenda, and Muslims everywhere in Kenya—whatever 
their views on bid’a—were encouraged to think of themselves as Muslims, 
with a shared political interest.
Radical preachers who combined Salafist views on religious practice 
with an explicit support for violent jihad have undoubtedly encouraged 
recruitment to al-Shabaab on the Kenya coast. But not all those attracted 
to the idea of violent jihad—who are almost all young men—have any 
particular interest in debates over practice. The young men who flocked 
to an advertised “jihad training” event at Masjid Musa—a mosque in the 
Majengo area of Mombasa—in early 2014 were not all Salafists, or regular 
worshippers at mosques where Salafists preach. The sense that Muslims 
are marginalised, and that this is an international condition, is not 
restricted to those who call themselves Salafists; it is an idea articulated, 
in different ways, by many preachers in many mosques, as well as on the 
internet (Chome 2019; Mwakimako & Willis 2014). It is by no means always 
advanced as a justification for violence—there are many prominent Muslims 
at the coast whose views on religious practice might be viewed as Salafist, 
but who nonetheless encourage peaceful political engagement through 
the constitution and through elections. That encouragement tends to be 
conditional—based not on the belief that liberal democracy is a good thing, 
but rather on the argument that it is the best way to pursue the interests 
of the Muslim community in current circumstances (Mwakimako & Willis 
2016). It is, however, the corollary of a substantial engagement in electoral 
politics; while a small number of Muslim youths at the coast have become 
involved in radical violence and denounce the very idea of democracy, it 
seems clear that large number of Muslims registered and voted in both 2013 
and 2017 elections.
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There was not, however, any “Muslim vote” in either of those sets of 
elections. In 2013 this was despite—or perhaps because of—attempts by 
various Muslim organisations to orchestrate a community consensus; in 
2017, little effort was made to mobilise Muslims collectively. The rivalrous 
multiplication of leadership bodies has been a feature of Islam in Kenya 
since the 1990s, and there have been repeated disputes over which, 
if any, organisation has the right to endorse particular candidates or 
policies (Constantin 1993; Ndzovu 2012). The rivalry sometimes sets coast 
Muslims against Somali or “up-country” Muslims, but there are rivalries 
for leadership amongst Muslims on the coast (Kresse 2009). Debates over 
practice can drive such rivalries. So, for example, the Kenya Assembly of 
Ulama and Imams (KAULI)—which despite its name, was really focussed on 
the coast—was created specifically to represent imams of “tariqa mosques,” 
who felt that they were inadequately represented by other bodies, notably 
the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), which was also very 
largely a coast organisation. Both have become rather inactive since 2013. 
The proliferation of Muslim representative organisations was been fuelled 
by personal rivalries, and perhaps by the availability of “anti-radicalisation” 
funds from the US and its allies, some of which have been channelled 
through such bodies. But doctrinal differences and external funding aside, 
there are other dividing lines among Muslims at the coast, which were 
perhaps most clearly evident in the distinction between CIPK and another 
organisation, the Kenya Muslim National Advisory Council (KEMNAC). 
Like CIPK, KEMNAC has been based at the coast, despite its name—and is, 
in fact, very largely restricted to Mombasa. The difference between these 
two organisations was not doctrinal, and has nothing to do with the debate 
over bid’a. It was, quite simply, based on ideas of racial category. CIPK 
was led by men who—whatever they may call themselves—would be called 
Swahili or Arabs by many coast people who view themselves as Africans. 
KEMNAC, on the other hand, has been led by a man who has assertively 
argued the claims of—as he puts it—Africans (Ndzovu 2012, 34).
3. Who Are the Wapwani?
This sense of racial difference is a powerful force on the coast. Its influence 
is felt well beyond the rivalries of Muslim leadership organisations. It is 
also, of course, deeply problematic. Many of those who claim some distant 
Yemeni or Omani ancestry would nonetheless insist that they are Africans, 
as well as Arabs; and one of the many ways in which the ethnonym Swahili 
has been used is to capture a sense of an identity which is both African and 
coastal, looking out to the Indian Ocean but also rooted in the continent 
(Constantin 1989; Topan 2004). Arab and African, some would say, are 
entirely compatible kinds of identity. Yet there are many others who simply 
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do not accept this, and who resent what they see as a long-standing social 
and economic dominance of coast society by people who they categorise 
as Arabs. Undoubtedly, this sense of racial difference is partly the result 
of British colonial policy, which linked these categories to distinct sets of 
rights, privileges and obligations—so that, for example, Arabs could own 
land, and vote, and Africans could not. Arabs were citizens and Africans 
were natives (Salim 1973, 183–246; Willis 1993). But as Glassman (2011) has 
argued of Zanzibar, racial thinking is not simply a colonial imposition; it 
draws on local understandings of identity in which a sense of indigeneity 
is a powerful force.
Whatever its origins, this idea of “race” continues to divide Muslims at the 
coast, and the population of the coast more generally, as Janet McIntosh’s 
work (2009; also Ndzovu 2012) has shown. African Muslims believe that they 
are subject to discrimination and exclusion by their Arab co-religionists, and 
readily locate this contemporary condition to a history of slavery which is 
seen (not entirely accurately) as a history of Arab oppression of Africans. 
Landlessness is a constant source of friction at the coast, especially along 
the coast and its near hinterland north of Mombasa, where the legacy of 
nineteenth-century slavery and Omani rule, of British colonial policy, and 
of post-colonial rule is that tens of thousands of people live as squatters on 
the land of large landowners (Kanyinga 1998). For decades, this friction has 
been understood, and expressed, in racial terms, as conflict between Arabs 
and Africans—although that, again, is a considerable simplification. While 
some accuse “up-country” people—and especially, Kikuyu—of grabbing 
land at the coast, there are many squatters who prefer to blame “the 
Arabs” for their plight. In talking of land, in particular, people play with an 
uncertain categorical distinction between what might be called “race” and 
“ethnicity,” which turns on an idea of autochthony. Up-country Kenyans 
are Africans—a term explicitly used—though they belong to other tribes; 
but “Arabs” are allegedly not. Public statements on racial difference have 
become less common in the face of threatened prosecutions by the National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission—but private language still routinely 
evokes race, in way that allows an allusive public style in which categories 
of racial difference are not mentioned, yet are ubiquitous.
The depth of this divide made itself apparent in the secessionist agitation 
associated with the MRC. The supporters of the MRC described themselves 
as wapwani. Yet there were uncertainties over who these wapwani were. The 
Facebook page of the MRC evoked a vision of the coast whose epitome was 
Mombasa’s Old Town: Arab or Swahili in culture. The chosen symbols of 
the movement, which echoed the (largely Arab and Swahili) Coast People’s 
Party of the 1960s, emphasised this link; in contrast, one self-defined 
African politician who was publicly critical of the MRC (though evidently 
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mindful of its potential to mobilise coast grievances), Chirau Mwakwere, 
suggested that the very name “Mombasa Republican Council” revealed how 
unrepresentative the movement was—a characteristically elliptical way 
of raising the issue of racial difference. Meanwhile, some of the written 
material circulating under the name of the MRC offered an inclusive, 
cosmopolitan vision of the coast; while other “MRC” literature pointedly 
excluded Arabs from membership of the community of wapwani (Willis & 
Gona 2013). These contradictions may to some degree reflect unresolved 
tensions in people’s own sense of their identity; but they evidently also 
reflect the way in which the “MRC” as a brand could be appropriated by 
different groups, who had very different ideas of what “the coast” was.
Neither are the “Africans” of the coast united. Since the 1940s, the term 
Mijikenda has come into use to express an idea of political community 
amongst “nine tribes” on the southern coast: the nine being usually 
listed as Digo, Duruma, Giryama, Rabai, Ribe, Kambe, Jibana, Chonyi and 
Kauma. There are considerable cultural and linguistic continuities among 
the people of these groups (though also some differences); their slightly 
halting emergence as a “super-tribe” was roughly contemporaneous with 
a similar process among the groups who became the Kalenjin. A product 
of the late-colonial period, and particularly of the frenzied politics around 
independence, Mijikenda identity reflected the power of the idea of a 
collective voice which was both African and distinctively of the coast 
(Willis & Gona 2013). Uncertain attempts to fold other ethnic groups—
notably the Taita and the Pokomo—into this wider identity have had little 
success, both because cultural and historical differences mean that there is 
little emotional power to this, and because members of those groups have 
seen little advantage in adopting this identity. If categorised as a single 
group, the Mijikenda form a clear majority of the population in the six 
counties of the coast: 1.9 million of a total coast population of 3.3 million, 
according to the 2009 census. Yet their sense of shared identity is fragile. 
Most Digo are Muslim, unlike other Mijikenda; not all Mijikenda languages 
are readily inter-comprehensible; and while multiple ties of migration 
and marriage bind Mijikenda, there are also bitter local disputes over land 
which can be expressed in terms of rivalries between Chonyi and Kauma, 
or Jibana and Giryama. At the same time, to be Mijikenda is not always 
so incompatible with being Swahili: ties of marriage and descent blur a 
boundary that appears very clear in rhetoric (Parkin 1989; Peake 1989). 
It is not, of course, unusual for identities to be multiple, and for larger 
groups to be internally fragmented. Yet it is striking that the mobilising 
and disciplining force of the idea of “being Mijikenda” seems so limited—
perhaps because these divisions have been exacerbated by an engagement 
with national politics which sees aspiring Mijikenda leaders evoking these 
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differences in attempts to undermine one another’s claims to leadership, 
and allows national politicians to playing on such divisions to keep the 
upper hand over their Mijikenda “point men.”
Repeated attempts by individuals to establish a national position as 
“coast” leaders have been confounded by ethnic and racial division. Ronald 
Ngala was engaged in a constant struggle—waged often along racial lines—
to assert his status (Stren 1974). Sharif Nassir became a powerful politician 
in Mombasa, but could never establish himself as a wider coast leader, 
because he was seen as a Yemeni Arab. Karisa Maitha, sometime protégé of 
Shariff Nassir (who used him to try and reach a Mijikenda constituency), 
became vocal in his denunciations of Arabs and achieved a degree of 
prominence, but at the cost of alienating his former patron. Rivalry for 
position in Kenya’s politics of ethno-regionalism is not unusual, but the 
coast has seen a particularly high turnover of politicians, particularly since 
the return of multi-partyism (Gona 2008). Najib Balala, who more than 
one national politician has hopefully sponsored as a potential coast leader, 
has never been able to reach a wider constituency because he is seen as 
an Arab—his “Republican Congress” party was a spectacular failure in 
the 2013 elections. Chirau Mwakwere, who aspired to be the coast “point 
man” for national politicians, was unable to build any sort of reputation 
outside his own Digo community, even among other Mijikenda. In 2013, 
the competition for the position of governor of Mombasa revealed very 
clearly the nature of racial and ethnic politics: the two leading candidates, 
widely seen as Arab or Arab/Swahili, each took care to ensure that they 
had a Mijikenda running mate. Between them, these partnerships took 88% 
of the vote. The successful candidate in that election, Ali Hassan Joho, has 
become the most influential individual in coast politics, and has achieved 
a national prominence.
Between 2014 and 2017, Joho apparently courted confrontation with 
Uhuru Kenyatta, presenting himself as the champion of coastal interests 
against central government. The gambit paid off; despite criticism of his 
performance as Mombasa’s governor, Joho won that position again in 2017 
with a substantial majority. But neither this prominence nor his unconcealed 
ambition to run for the presidency have made him the unquestioned leader 
of the coast; there have been repeated attempts by Mijikenda politicians 
to form groups or parties that specifically exclude him.4 In the run-up to 
the 2017 election one Mijikenda politician forecast that Joho would lose as 
4. Oketch, Willis. 2016. “Governor Hassan Joho Says He Will Be First 
President from the Coast Come 2022.” Standard Digital, 21 March. http://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000195586/governor-hassan-joho-says-he-will-
be-first-president-from-coast-come-2022. For one example of plans for coastal 
unity which exclude Joho, and are Mijikenda focussed, see Gari, Alphonce. 2016. 
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he lacked the support of the “indigenous communities”—which turned out 
be quite wrong, but was a reminder of the persistence of that racialised 
language.5 The aftermath of the 2017 elections was revealing. Joho, together 
with the governor of Kilifi County Amason Kingi (a Mijikenda) made bold 
statements threatening coast secession as a response to the debacle of the 
presidential poll.6 Both men then stepped back from that confrontational 
line, and were quick to welcome the “handshake” that reconciled Kenyatta 
and Odinga in March 2018. Since then, Kingi has apparently become more 
distant from Joho; one of his reported public statements simultaneously 
asserted and denounced divisions: “The importance of the Mijikenda must 
be recognised, as well as the unity of the coast people.”7
Joho’s presidential ambitions rest on the idea that he might become the 
regional big man for the coast. That hope is inspired by what looks like 
a pattern of voting, yet it may be misplaced. In the elections of 1992 and 
1997, Coast Province—with the exception of Mombasa—was considered 
something of a “KANU zone,” and Moi received 63% of the presidential 
votes at the coast in 1992 and 67% in 1997. At that time, however, the ruling 
party’s dominance relied on a patchwork of local leaders playing to local 
constituencies, not on a single key “coast” intermediary. The coast vote 
looked more like a real phenomenon in the series of polls since 2005 that 
gave a consistent majority for Raila Odinga, or for causes supported by 
him, with an overall rise in participation levels.
“Movement to Unite Counties for 2017 Poll.” The Star, 29 April. http://www.the-
star.co.ke/news/2016/04/29/movement-to-unite-counties-for-2017-poll_c1341235. 
5. Mwaboza, Anania. 2017. “Why Joho Will Lose on August 8th.” The Star, 27 
June.
6. Ahmed, Mohamed. 2017. “Hassan Joho, Amason Kingi Call for Breakaway of 
Coast.” Daily Nation, 3 November. https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Hassan-Joho-
Amason-Kingi-call-for-breakaway-of-Coast-from-Kenya/1056-4172150-2rxmh2z/
index.html. 
7. Reported in Lwanga, Charles. 2018. “New Bid for Mijikenda Unity Announced 
at Cultural Festival.” Daily Nation, 12 September. https://www.nation.
co.ke/counties/kilifi/New-bid-for-Mijikenda-unity-announced-at-cultural-
festival/1183282-4752918-fq0qlxz/index.html. 
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Table 1. Voting figures on the coast from 2005 to 2017,  
with participation rates and percentages of votes for Raila Odinga







































Sources: figures released by ECK and IEBC.
This does suggest that voters at the coast see themselves as very much a 
part of Kenyan politics, whatever the talk of secessionism. It also suggests 
that the determined efforts by Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto to shift 
public opinion at the coast in advance of the 2017 elections—notably 
through some limited but high profile interventions over the chronic 
problem of land—were not very successful.8 But to interpret this pattern 
as evidence that the coast as a whole supports Raila, or is an “ODM” zone, 
or that Joho could count on this vote in his own presidential bid, would 
not be safe. In the August  2017 poll, as previously, the vote for Odinga 
was concentrated very much in the southern half of the coast (where the 
bulk of the population is); Lamu and Tana River counties saw considerable 
support for Kenyatta. Despite Joho’s national prominence, the turnout—
and the vote for Odinga—in his Mombasa County was weaker than any 
other southern part of the coast (a 59% turnout, and a 70% vote for Odinga; 
by contrast, Kilifi saw a 65% turnout and an 84% poll for Odinga). It would 
seem safer to say that voting patterns have indicated a broad preference for 
devolution, and a suspicion of central government, in the southern counties 
of what was once Coast Province; since Odinga has been an advocate 
8. Tsuma Nyassi, Daniel, Kalume Kazungu, and PSCU. 2016. “Uhuru to Visit Lamu 
and Issue Title Deeds to Waitiki Land Owners.” Daily Nation, 6 January. http://
www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-to-visit-Lamu-and-give-title-deeds-to-
Waitiki-land-owners/1064-3022564-xwncc6/index.html [archive]. “Uhuru, Ruto, 
Start Coast Tour Full of Goodies.” 2016. Daily Nation, 3 September. https://nation.
africa/news/politics/Uhuru-Ruto--start-Coast-tour-full-of-goodies/3126390-
3367774-15csglwz/index.html [archive].
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for devolution, and the avowed enemy of centralised government, this 
favoured him. Were Joho to stand for the presidency, that support would 
not necessarily transfer to him.
Conclusion
The multiple divisions of the “coast” mean that no politician has ever been 
fully able to claim to represent this contested entity. Odinga’s popularity 
was itself anomalous in a context where the most prominent “national” 
politician in any region is usually a person from that area—it seemed to 
contradict the logic of ethno-regionalism. His role as coast champion was 
the consequence of his status as an outsider, but also an outsider who is not 
connected with the coast’s history of marginalisation: neither his family, 
nor his ethnic group are seen as land-grabbers at the coast. Coast politicians 
are irretrievably marked by their religious identity, by their ethnicity and—
most of all—by the imagined but immensely powerful categories of race 
which shape and divide the coast. Odinga benefitted for a time by standing 
apart from those divisions and at the same time supporting devolution, 
which commanded widespread support.
Yet while “devolution” may be popular in principle, there are significant 
differences in how people understand the term, which expose the multiple 
divisions among the imagined “wapwani”: will it offer Muslims relief from 
the apparently arbitrary violence of the security forces? Will it give land 
title to squatters? Will it allow Digo to monopolise employment in Kwale, 
or Giryama to do so in Kilifi? These divisions have been amplified, not 
resolved, by the debate over the Building Bridges Initiative. Rival politicians 
from the coast continue to seek support for their own ambitions—and 
rewards for their particular religious, ethnic or racial community—by 
offering themselves as intermediaries to national politicians. Despite the 
constant rhetoric of coast unity, the coast remains profoundly divided: 
what devolution should mean, and which “coast” people should benefit 
from it, remain very much open to debate.
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